

Not Used

THE TANAY INCIDENT IS CLOSED

December 26, 1937

This was an eminently happy day and it showed that wisdom and good sense of the Governments which refused to be stampeded into potential war in spite of the tendency of the one side to "save face" at almost all costs, and in spite of an outrageous affront offered to the other. The Japanese Government had expressed the most abject apologies for the sinking of the Tanay and we, without a moment's delay, accepted those apologies. I thought that our Government's note was a masterpiece; we had observed with satisfaction the promptness with which the Japanese Government had admitted responsibility, expressed regret, and offered amends; we accept the Japanese action as responsive to our requests and expectations; we each reply on our own evidence and conclusions as to the details; we express the earnest hope that the steps taken by the Japanese Government will prove effective toward preventing any further attacks or unlawful interference by Japanese authorities or forces with American nationals, interests, or property in China.

Equally masterly was the Japanese arrangement that its note should get to Washington on Christmas Eve and should be dealt with by our Government on Christmas Day (our reply was dispatched from Washington at 3 o'clock on Christmas afternoon). The Japanese could hardly have failed to realize that the Christmas spirit is strong in our country and that the thought "Peace on Earth, good will toward men" must inevitably color and influence our decision. Anyway, I was so profoundly happy at the outcome that when I called on Hirata at noon I entered his room wreathed in smiles (a very different attitude from my call on him on December 17) and told him that I brought good news. When I had finished reading our note to him, his eyes were really filled with tears and he showed as much emotion as any Japanese is capable of showing; he said: "I heartily thank your Government and you yourself for this decision. I am very, very happy. You have brought me a splendid Christmas present." I think his relief must have been tremendous, as was mine. We have, for the moment, safely passed a difficult, a very difficult, hurdle.

Yet I cannot look into the future with any feeling of serenity. Other hurdles, perhaps even more difficult ones, are almost certain to present themselves, and the patience of the American people is not inexhaustible. War between Japan and the United States will not come through mere interference with or even destruction of our tangible interests in China, or yet from the breach of treaty rights, or the breaking down of principles for which we stand, but war may very easily come from some further act in derogation of American sovereignty or from an accumulation of open affronts. Therein lies the danger, and it is a real danger which no one with knowledge of the irresponsibility of the Japanese military as distinguished from the Japanese Government can eliminate from the future picture. I left the Minister's house realizing only too clearly that our satisfaction at the settlement of the Penay incident may be but temporary and that the rock upon which for five years I have been trying to build a substantial edifice of Japanese-American relations has broken down into treacherous sand.

Excerpt from "Ten Years in Japan"
Diary of Former Ambassador Crow
Pages 239 and 240

辯護団書類二〇六(二〇)號

服部譯

バネー號事件落着

一九三七年十二月二十六日 今日こそは眞に佳日と云ふべきである。本日、此處に日米兩國政府は其の誠智と良識とを發揮し、何はともあれ、面子を傷つけまいとする前
 者側の超勢及び後者側に於ては之に對し加へられたる不法外な侮辱の何前
 にもとらはれることなく、恰までも、起り得べき戦争への突入を阻止
 したのである。日本政府はバネー號擊沈に關しては最も誠虚なる謝罪の何前
 意を表し、我方亦一瞬の遲疑逡巡する事もなく、右謝罪を受容れた。私
 は是に對する我政府の覺書は正に傑出した出來であると思つた。即ち右
 覚書中に於て吾々は、日本政府が迅速に、責任の所在を容認し、遺憾の
 意を表し且賠償を申出でたことに就き満足なる旨述べ、日本側の右措置
 が將來に亘り日本側當局者乃至軍隊により支那に於ける米國人、米
 国利益、亦は財産に對し攻撃又は不法なる干渉の加へられるを阻止する
 のに有效ならんことを切に希望する旨等述べた。又、日本側に於いて、其の
 覚書が華府にクリスマス前夜に到着し從つ

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て我政府がクリスマス當日夫を取り扱ふことになる様に手配したことは同様、眞に時宜を得た措置と云はねばなるまい。(我方回答はクリスマスの午後三時に華府より發せられた)日本側は、我國に於ける「クリスマス」の精神が根強く、從つて「地上の平和、万人友愛の思想は必ずや我方決定に良い影響を「齎らすに相違なからん旨見逃す筈はあり得なかつたのである。鬼に角、私はかゝる結末を見たことに對し喜びを抑へ切れず、正午に廣田を訪れる際の如きは、滿面に微笑を漏へて(十二月十七日に彼を訪れた際にくらべると天地の差程の態度であつた)一部屋に入り、良い報せを持つて來たと告げた程であつた。私が我方の覺悟を讀み終へるや、彼は眞實兩眼に涙を滲へ、日本人の表し得る最大限の感情を露してゐた。そして「私はこんなに喜ばしいことはない。全く素晴らしい「クリスマス」プレゼントを齎らして下さつたと述べたが、彼がどうの様に安堵したか、全く私と同様に計り知れない程であつたに違ひないと思ふ。之で我々は、ここ當座の間、困難な、極めて超え難い障害物を一つ無事に通過したといふ譯である。

然しながらさればとて、私は將來を思ふときは必ずしも安閑としては居れない氣がする。他の障害物、然もより困難なる障害物が必ずや出現するといふものである。日米間の戰争は中國に於ける吾々の明白なる権益に對する單なる干渉乃至は更に其の侵害があつたとしても、夫を契機と

して惹起されるとは思はれないし、亦、條約上の権利の破棄、乃至は吾々の主張する諸原理が蹂躪される様なことがあつても容易には惹起されるとは思はれない。然しながら米國の主権を此の上毀損する様な行爲、又は公然たる侮辱の度重なる様な事があれば、直ぐにも戦争は起り得るのである。危険は正に此點に存するのであり、然かも其危険たるや、日本政府に比し無責任極りない日本軍部に就いて多少でも知つてゐる者ならば將來を予見するに當り決して除去して考へられない切實さを伴ふものである。私は大臣官邸を辭去するに當り、バネー號事件の解決に對する吾々の満足も一時的に過ぎないものかも知れず、又五年間營々として日本米關係を堅牢なるものに築き上げんとした其の基礎岩石が今や崩り去つて頼りない砂地と化した事實を一入まさまさと思ひ知らされるのであつた。

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FIRST INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
GENERAL UGAKI

May 31, 1938

General Ugaki,* the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, received the diplomatic chiefs of mission individually today. Apparently without knowledge of English, he spoke through an interpreter.

He said that he desired to do his utmost to develop good relations with the United States, adding that having had no experience in diplomacy he is unused to the intricacies of that profession and that therefore he will always speak frankly. I replied that with thirty-four years of experience in diplomacy I had become steadily more convinced of the stupidity of indirection and that he could always count on complete frankness from me in our relations. We had therefore mutually arrived at the same conception by different roads.

I said that it would be helpful if I might report to my government about his attitude toward the protection of American interests in China. The Minister replied definitely that he would guarantee the protection of American interests in China and that if questions should arise in connection therewith he wished me to inform him of them.

* An officer of liberal leanings who, when later the Emperor chose him as Prime Minister and directed him to form a cabinet, failed to do so because the Army regarded him as too liberal and refused to nominate a Minister of War.

辯護側文書第二〇六號（二三一）

外務大臣宇垣大將トノ初會見

一九三八年五月三十一日

今回ノ外相宇垣大將ハ各國最高外交使節トノ個別的接見ヲ本日行ツタ。彼ハ英語ヲ知ラナイト見エ、通譯ヲ通シテ語ツタ。

彼ハ米國トノ親交ヲ進展サセルクメ全力ヲ費シタイト思ツテキル旨ヲ語リ、ソレニ加ヘテ外交政策ニ全ク経験ヲ有タヌ故ソノ複雑怪奇サニナラワズ依ツ

テ常ニ卒直ニ語リ度イト語ツタ。

私ハ亦私ガ外交生活三七四年ノ経験ニヨツテ汪國スルコトノ愚ナルコトヲクヅク悟ツテ吾ルカラ吾々ノ關係ニ於テハ何時デモ私ガ全ク腹巣ノナイコトヲ信ジテ戴イテ宜シイト答ヘタ。茲ニ於テ吾々ハ夫々遠ツタ道カラ同一ノ考ヘニ到達シタノデアル。

私ハ支那ニ於ケル米國ノ利益擁護ニ對スル彼ノ態度ヲ私ガ政府ニ報告スルコトガ出來レバ非常ニ助ケニナルダラウト云ツタ。外相ハ斷言シテ彼ハ支那ニ於ケル米國ノ利益保全ハ保證スルト云ヒ、若シ之ニ關聯シテ問題ガ起ツタラソレヲ彼ニ告ゲテ欲シイト云ツタ。

(X) 自由主義的ナ人物デ後ニ天皇ガ彼ヲ首相ニ選定シ組閣ヲ命ビラレタ時軍
ガ彼ヲ余リ自由主義デアルトテ陸軍大臣ノ指令ヲ拒ンダノデ組閣ニ至ラナ
カツタ人物デアル。

グルー前米國大使日記「在日十年」抜

二四六頁

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Not used

WHY FOREIGN MINISTER HIROTA LOST HIS JOB

June 21, 1938

A prominent member of the Japanese Government, speaking with full knowledge of the situation, has given the following picture of the purposes of the recent change in the cabinet and the intentions of the Government as they shape up at present. Prince Konoye and other members of the Government realized that if progress were to be made in consolidating Japan's position in China and in avoiding serious friction with Great Britain and the United States the conduct of everything except purely military affairs must be taken out of the hands of the Army and lodged in the civil part of the Government. Hirota had fallen because he was too weak in opposing the Army while at the same time insisting that the Foreign Office has control of Japan's foreign relations in China. This the Army would not tolerate, and it was for this reason that they were now setting up the so-called "China Organ" to deal exclusively with questions relating to China.

General Ugaki and Finance Minister Ikeda had accepted office only on condition that political and economic affairs in China should be taken out of the hands of the military, and this explains the appointment of General Itagaki as Minister of War, because he has the confidence of the younger officers in the Army and at the same time believes that the Army should stay out of politics and should limit itself to its duties as an efficient fighting machine. Both Ugaki and Ikeda realize that the solution of Japan's problem in China will be impossible unless good relations are maintained with Great Britain and the United States and Ugaki therefore proposes to do everything possible to see that their respective interests are protected. Obviously it is not going to be easy to take these matters out of the hands of the military and to persuade them to follow policies laid down by the civil elements in the Government, and whether they can succeed is an open question. At the same

time the purpose of setting up the North China Development Company and the Central China Renovation Company is to take economic affairs in China out of the hands of the Army. In all these questions "the Big Five" see eye to eye. The foregoing statement of the Government's position "came straight home from the horse's mouth" and is considered entirely reliable.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Crew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 248

廣田外相失脚ノ経緯

一九三八年六月二十一日

現在ノ状勢ニ充分ナ知識ヲ有ツ日本政府ノ一高官ハ今回ノ内閣變動ノ目的及ビ政府ノ現在ノ意圖ヲ次ノ如ク解説シテ居ル。近衛公其ノ他ノ政府要人ハ支那ニ於ケル日本ノ地位ヲ鞏固ニシ且英米トノ敵シイ摩擦ヲ避ケルタメニ何等力ノ滋展ヲ期待スルタメニハ純然タル軍事問題以外ノアラユル活動ヲ軍部カラ奪ヒコレヲ政府ノ文官島ノ手ニ收メサセル娶ノアルコトヲ悟ツテキル。廣田氏ハ支那ニ於ケル日本外交ノ支配權ガ外務省ニアルコトヲ主張シテ居リナガラ、軍部ニ對抗スル力ガ充分無イタメニ失脚シタ。斯カルコトハ軍部ノ到底怪認シ得ザル所デ、コノ故ニコソ現在軍部ハ支那關係問題ヲ専ニ處理セシメルタメ所謂支那機關ヲ設立シテ居ル。

宇垣將軍及ビ池田國務大臣ハ支那ニ於ケル政府、經濟問題ガ軍部カラ取り上ケラセルコトヲ條件トシテノミ入閣シタモノデ、コレニヨツテ坂垣將軍ノ隙相就任ヲ説明スルコトガ出來ル。何故ナラ將軍ハ軍部若手將校ノ信頼ヲ集メテ居リ同時ニ彼ハ軍ガ政治圈外ニアラネバナラサズ且はガ侵レタル機關